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Abstract
Two independent studies by two separate research teams (from Hong Kong and Singapore) failed to detect any influenza
RNA landing on, or inhaled by, a life-like, human manikin target, after exposure to naturally influenza-infected volunteers.
For the Hong Kong experiments, 9 influenza-infected volunteers were recruited to breathe, talk/count and cough, from
0.1 m and 0.5 m distance, onto a mouth-breathing manikin. Aerosolised droplets exhaled from the volunteers and entering
the manikin’s mouth were collected with PTFE filters and an aerosol sampler, in separate experiments. Virus detection was
performed using an in-house influenza RNA reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assay. No influenza
RNA was detected from any of the PTFE filters or air samples. For the Singapore experiments, 6 influenza-infected volunteers
were asked to breathe (nasal/mouth breathing), talk (counting in English/second language), cough (from 1 m/0.1 m away)
and laugh, onto a thermal, breathing manikin. The manikin’s face was swabbed at specific points (around both eyes, the
nostrils and the mouth) before and after exposure to each of these respiratory activities, and was cleaned between each
activity with medical grade alcohol swabs. Shadowgraph imaging was used to record the generation of these respiratory
aerosols from the infected volunteers and their impact onto the target manikin. No influenza RNA was detected from any of
these swabs with either team’s in-house diagnostic influenza assays. All the influenza-infected volunteers had diagnostic
swabs taken at recruitment that confirmed influenza (A/H1, A/H3 or B) infection with high viral loads, ranging from 105-108
copies/mL (Hong Kong volunteers/assay) and 104–107 copies/mL influenza viral RNA (Singapore volunteers/assay). These
findings suggest that influenza RNA may not be readily transmitted from naturally-infected human source to susceptible
recipients via these natural respiratory activities, within these exposure time-frames. Various reasons are discussed in an
attempt to explain these findings.
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Introduction
In recent years, discussions over the most clinically significant
routes of influenza transmission have been extensive [1,2].
Confusion and disagreements surround the definitions of the
various transmission routes including ‘close contact’ transmission,
‘airborne’ transmission and ‘droplet’ transmission [3–6].
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Traditionally in outbreak investigations, airborne transmission
has been implicated in secondary cases where direct contact with
the infected source has not been documented. Close contact
transmission has been used to explain secondary cases arising from
documented close contact with the presumed index case [6].
However, it is important to note that even in close proximity,
multiple transmission routes may all be responsible for dissemi-
nating the infection, i.e. person-to-person transmission in such
situations can be potentially due to either airborne, droplet and/or
direct physical contact transmission [7,8].
In the close contact exposure scenario, small droplets generated
by an infectious patient can be directly inhaled and deposit in both
the upper and the lower airway, whereas large droplets can be also
be directly inhaled, but the majority of these will probably deposit
in the upper airways only, or directly enter the recipient’s eyes or
even the mouth as a direct droplet infection (as opposed to self-
inoculated infection) [1,9–12]. Long distance airborne transmis-
sion has been postulated to be introduced by small droplet nuclei
being carried by ambient airflows, where the moisture from small
droplets has mostly evaporated away [7].
The actual clinical and public health implications of these
different routes of transmission in everyday situations remains
controversial [1,2,6,7,9,13,14], and many researchers have been
focusing on the potential for human influenza transmission during
real-life activities such as breathing, talking, coughing and sneezing
[15–18]. These studies have focused on characterising the number,
size and content of droplets generated by such activities. Yet this
data by itself is not sufficient to determine true transmissibility
potential of any viruses carried in these droplets – they still need to
reach a susceptible recipient and be inhaled in a sufficient
infectious dose (for that individual) to cause infection and disease.
In this paper, two independent studies conducted during 2010,
2011 and 2012 by two different teams are reported, one from
Hong Kong and one from Singapore. The two studies had an
identical aim, to test the potential for the transmission of influenza
from a naturally influenza-infected human to a life-like human
manikin ‘recipient’ through real-life respiratory activities, such as
breathing, talking, coughing sources. The outcomes of these two
studies are presented together due to the similar and largely
unexpected results, which showed little or no evidence of
detectable influenza (RNA) transmission from the human source
to the manikin recipient, with any mode of respiratory activity.
Note that the approach used in these experiments is different
from several previous studies in that there is no attempt to capture
all exhaled particles – the main focus of these studies is to examine
how many of these potentially viral-laden particles actually reach
the target manikins.
The Hong Kong study used a shop display manikin, customised
for ‘mouth-inhaling’, to examine the quantity of influenza virus
inhaled when exposed to a naturally influenza-infected human
volunteer source. This study only examined the inhalation phase
of a potential recipient. The Singapore study used a commercial
thermal, breathing manikin with a full breathing cycle to quantify
the amount of influenza virus landing on facial skin sites.
Materials and Methods
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of
the University of Hong Kong. Signed informed consent was
obtained from all participants. This ethics approval included the
participation of children in this study, for whom verbal and written
consent was also obtained from their parents, caregivers or
guardians, as appropriate. Ethics approval for the Singapore study
was granted by the Domain Specific Review Board (DSRB) of the
National Healthcare Group (2009/00341) Singapore, and in-
formed verbal and written consent was obtained from each
participant in the study.
Hong Kong experiments (2010–2011)
For these experiments (performed during the 2010–2011
influenza season in Hong Kong SAR), a customised manikin
was used as the model of a human recipient. A normal shop
display manikin was obtained and a mouth orifice hollowed out,
into which was fitted a mouth-piece connected to a pump through
the back of the manikin’s neck (Figure 1). This pump maintained
a continuous inhalation flow of 12.5 L/min, to simulate the
inhalation phase of human respiration. The inhalation rate of the
manikin was set to twice that of natural human inhalation to create
a similar inhalation flow field when both inhalation and exhalation
are present. This setting arises from the following argument: if a
typical human breath cycle consists of a 50:50 inhalation:exhala-
tion ratio then the inhalation flow rate is equal to two times the
tidal volume times the breathing frequency. The factor of two
arises because you are only inhaling half the time, i.e. you multiply
the minute ventilation by a factor of two to get the inhalation flow
rate because you only spend half the breath cycle inhaling (you are
exhaling for the other half) [19,20]. This also maximized SKC bio-
sampler air sampling efficiency.
Once the manikin and the pump were set up, two methods were
used to capture aerosolised virus produced by the naturally
influenza-infected volunteers: 1) a polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE)
filter inserted into the mouth orifice of the manikin, to trap any
aerosolised virus (Figure 1A); 2) and a commercially available air
sampler (the 5 ml SKC BioSampler, SKC Inc., Eighty Four, PA
USA: http://www.skcinc.com/prod/225-9594.asp) with 2 ml
viral transport medium, which was attached to the mouth orifice
through the back of the manikin’s neck (Figures 1B and 1C). This
air sampler was selected as it has been shown to perform well in
collecting influenza-laden air samples effectively [21].
Each of these methods was used separately with each volunteer
to capture aerosolised virus. The two methods were not used in
combination with any of the volunteers. The reason for the two
sampling methods was to allow the capture of large droplets that
travelled ballistically as expelled from the source volunteer,
transported by the source exhalation airflow (PTFE filters), as
well as any smaller, droplet nuclei that were truly airborne, using
the SKC BioSampler.
All the PTFE filters were kept in sealed plastic bags to prevent
contamination and installed immediately prior to the experiments.
Similarly, the mouth-pieces were sterilised and kept in sealed
packets and only installed immediately before each experiment
with the human volunteers. To capture the virus using the SKC
BioSampler, a tissue culture medium (Medium 199, Life
Technologies, Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR) was tested and found
to be appropriate for the viral capture media. In addition, a
baseline efficiency experiment was also performed to ensure that
there was minimal loss of detection sensitivity using the PCR
method when detecting for the presence of any viral RNA on the
PTFE filter.
This study was conducted in a public hospital and a university
health clinic during two distinct periods (August to September
2010 and January to February 2011). Patients over 21 years of age
with influenza-like illness (ILI: any of cough, fever $38uC, sore
throat, headache, malaise, myalgia, lethargy) in the previous three
days were invited to participate in the study.
A rapid point-of-care test (QuickVue Influenza A+B rapid
diagnostic test, Quidel Corp., San Diego, CA, USA: sensitivity:
0.68, specificity: 0.96) [22] was used as instructed by the
Absence of Detectable Influenza RNA Transmitted via Human Aerosols
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manufacturer as a screening test, to confirm influenza infection.
Patients with positive diagnostic results were then invited for the
exhaled breath sampling experiment. Nasal and throat swabs were
collected into universal transport medium (UTM, Copan Diag-
nostics, Murietta, CA, USA) for diagnostic testing using an in-
house influenza reverse transcription quantitative polymerase
chain reaction (RT-qPCR) assay [23], to further confirm influenza
infection and establish a baseline viral load.
Once the manikin was set up, for each sampling method, the
recruited, naturally influenza-infected volunteers were asked to
perform various respiratory activities (including breathing, count-
ing, talking and coughing) when facing the customised manikin at
a distance of 0.1 m and 0.5 m. The overall exposure period of the
manikin target to each influenza-infected human volunteer was
around 10–15 minutes. After each set of respiratory activities was
conducted with the PTFE filter or the SKC BioSampler, the filter
or capture media was removed and stored. The PTFE filter was
first dipped in 2 mL UTM (universal viral transport medium) prior
to storage. All specimens were stored at 2 to 8uC for less than
24 hours before PCR testing to determine the presence and
quantity of influenza virus present.
For the PTFE filter samples, briefly, the mouthpiece filter
holder was removed carefully and the filter removed. The filter
was then soaked in 2 mL of UTM for 15 minutes, during which
there were three episodes of vortexing for 30 seconds to transfer as
much virus from the PTFE filter to the UTM for influenza RT-
PCR testing. From this UTM, 140 mL was used for the RNA
extraction step, without further concentration steps. This RT-PCR
assay used consensus primers to target the matrix (MP) gene of the
virus [23]. Calibrators were included in each run to allow a
standard curve to be plotted to estimate the copy numbers in the
samples. This assay had a detection limit of approximately 18,000
viral RNA copies/ml UTM.
To check the sensitivity of the PTFE capture method, samples
of the PTFE filter were inoculated (by droplets of 1, 5, 25 mL
volume) with different, known amounts of influenza RNA, then
run through the whole extraction and RT-PCR process for
influenza RNA detection. Overall, there was relatively little loss of
sensitivity with the log10(inoculated) vs. log10(detected) viral loads
being mostly within 10% of each other.
Singapore experiments (2011–2012)
For the Singapore experiments, otherwise healthy volunteers
with an ILI were recruited from the local university student health
centre clinic during the ‘autumn/winter’ period (September 2011
to February 2012). Successful recruits were taken directly to the
experimental chamber, where they would expose a life-size,
breathing, thermal manikin to various exhaled respiratory
airflows. Clinical inclusion criteria included ILI with a tempera-
ture of at least 38uC. If the recruits were unable to go straight to
the experimental chamber immediately after their clinic visit, they
were excluded from the study. Before each experiment, a baseline
nasopharyngeal swab (NPS) was taken from each participant for
diagnostic testing.
A full-size, commercial thermal, breathing manikin (PT Teknik,
Espergærde, Denmark: http://pt-teknik.dk/history) was used as
the target for these exposure experiments. Both the manikin’s
thermal and breathing modes were turned on, during these
exposure experiments, though only the manikin’s face was to be
Figure 1. Airborne sampling experimental set-up (Hong Kong experiments), showing: A and B. Design of the mouthpiece with PTFE filter
(‘filter’) in place. C and D. Installation of the SKC BioSampler, with the mouthpiece, in the manikin.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107338.g001
Absence of Detectable Influenza RNA Transmitted via Human Aerosols
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e107338
tested for the presence of influenza RNA, after exposure to the
naturally influenza-infected volunteers.
Before each exposure session, the manikin’s face was cleaned
with medical grade alcohol swabs and allowed to dry for 2–
3 minutes. Baseline ‘clean’ swabs were taken from around the
manikin’s mouth (1 swab), nose (1 swab) and eyes (1 swab), before,
then again after the manikin was exposed to the volunteer
performing (Figure 2). The participant performed the following
respiratory activities directly (within a 1 m distance) into the face
of the manikin: nasal breathing (for 20 seconds), mouth breathing
(20 s), counting slowly from one to ten in English (43 s), counting
slowly from one to ten in a second language (e.g. Mandarin,
German, 43 s), laughing (10 s) and coughing (10 s). Coughing was
performed at both far (about ,1 m) and near (,0.1 m) distances
from the manikin’s face.
The airflow patterns produced during each of these exposure
events were visualised and recorded using real-time shadowgraph
imaging (Figure 2, 3, Video S1), using an experimental set-up as
previously described elsewhere [24,25]. In each experiment, for a
participant, one diagnostic swab from the participant and 36 facial
swabs (representing pre- and post-exposure swabs from each of the
eyes, nose and mouth sites), each collected in to 3 mL of UTM,
from the manikin were taken for influenza testing. Testing was
performed using a routine diagnostic quantitative polymerase
chain reaction (qPCR) assay adapted from one already in service
[26,27]. This assay had a detection limit of approximately 3000
viral RNA copies/ml UTM.
Results
Hong Kong experiments (2010–2011)
Results were available from 9 volunteers in total, of whom 8
were infected with influenza A and one with influenza B. Each of
the volunteers either counted (and/or talked) and/or breathed
and/or coughed in various combinations for varying durations.
Seven of these volunteers were only 0.1 m from the recipient
manikin. The last two volunteers who were exposed to the manikin
when only the SKC BioSampler was being used (sampling for
airborne droplet nuclei), were also exposed from a larger distance
of 0.5 m. Despite the variety of source respiratory activities, the
two different sampling methods and exposure distances, no
influenza RNA was detected from either the PTFE filter or
SKC BioSampler samples from any of the volunteer exposures
(Table 1).
Singapore experiments (2011–2012)
Out of a total of 23 participants recruited for this study, 6 were
diagnosed positive (6/23= 26%) for influenza virus (2 seasonal A/
H3N2, 1 pandemic A/H1N1pdm and 3 influenza B). Most of
these volunteers presented within three days of illness onset (3 at 2
days, 1 each at 1, 3 and 6 days post-onset). Despite strongly
positive diagnostic PCR results for influenza RNA (range: 4.33–
6.83 log10) from the nasal swabs of the 6 volunteers, none of the
post-exposure swabs taken from the manikin’s face was found to be
positive, after exposure to any of the respiratory activities. These
manikin swabs were also tested for inhibitory substances to PCR
by spiking them with influenza RNA positive control – no PCR
inhibition was detected in any of these samples (Table 2).
Discussion
These experiments were conducted to further the understanding
of how influenza is transmitted amongst humans. Multiple studies
have been published on influenza air-sampling from the environ-
ment or human or simulated sources [15–18,28–30], as well as
influenza transmission between various animal models [31,32].
Yet there have been few, if any studies focusing on the recipient
end of the influenza transmission pathway. One such study by
Lindsley et al [30] investigated the effect of wearing a face shield
on the viral load potentially inhaled by the wearer, using a
Figure 2. Singapore experimental set-up, showing: Swabbing sites for the manikins’ face (A) for influenza testing. Shadowgraph images of far-
(B) and near- cough (C) distances (see accompanying online Video S1 for further details of these shadowgraph images).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107338.g002
Figure 3. Example of cough shadowgraph image showing the
dispersal of the exhaled puff. Parameters that affect the dispersal of
this exhaled airflow include the mouth-opening diameter (D0),
propagation distance (x), and spreading angle (a) (see accompanying
online Video S1 for further details of these shadowgraph images).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107338.g003
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simulated coughing patient source and breathing healthcare
worker recipient (wearing the face shield). They found that the
face shield was highly effective in reducing the amount of virus
potentially reaching the recipient by over 90% at separation
distances of either 46 cm or 183 cm. However, continued
presence in the same chamber would eventually result in a
reduction of only ,80% as dispersion of the smaller, airborne
particles in the room would eventually travel around the face mask
to be inhaled. It was unclear what the starting aerosolised viral
load was in this study.
This investigational stage of the transmission pathway might be
termed: ‘end-point host-exposure and sampling’, i.e. what might
be actually inhaled at the face vs. what might be potentially
inhaled, based on the larger, air-sampled ‘source’ environment.
The lack of any detectable influenza RNA from the swabs taken
from the manikin’s face (Singapore experiments) and inhaled
breath (Hong Kong experiments) after exposure to infected
volunteers, was initially surprising, but became more understand-
able in light of the study published by Milton and colleagues [18].
Again, note that the approach used in these experiments is
different from several previous studies as there is no attempt to
capture all exhaled particles. The main aim of these ‘end-point
sampling’ studies is to investigate how many of these potentially
viral-laden particles actually reach the target manikins.
Large droplets may be less likely to transmit influenza
In the Singapore experiments, the cycle threshold (Ct) values for
the PCR positive NPS samples from the influenza positive recruits
were all reasonably low (indicating the presence of a relatively high
viral load) in these samples. The real-time shadowgraph video
footage taken during these experiments clearly show the cough
puff impinging directly onto the manikin’s face in the vicinity of
these swabbing sites (Figure 2, Video S1). Possible explanations
for this might be that despite the relatively high influenza load on
the NPS samples from these naturally infected recruits, the
droplets expelled during these respiratory activities did not carry
high numbers of viruses to transmit to the manikin’s face.
More intriguingly is the possibility that the viral-laden saliva/
mucous in the oral cavity is not of uniform viscosity, with the more
localised immune responses in parts of the mouth (and/or oro-/
naso-pharynx) increasing the local viscosity, thus allowing the
lower viral load saliva/mucous of lower viscosity being preferen-
tially expelled during respiratory activities. A review by Fabian et
al. [33] suggests that salivary mucins, particularly MU7, have a
high affinity for and may trap and agglutinate micro-organisms
such as bacteria, fungi and viruses. Also another salivary mucin,
MUC5b, has been shown to have antiviral properties, and can
form hydrophilic viscoelastic gels that can increase the viscosity of
saliva.
In the Hong Kong experiments, the results suggest that
influenza virus cannot be detected in the inhaled breath after a
source exposure from a minimum distance of 10 cm or greater, for
these 15 patients. Similarly with the Singapore experiment, it is
possible that the influenza virus levels in the exhalation airflows
were just too low to be transmitted in detectable quantities to the
recipient manikin. In these Hong Kong experiments, after the
participant finished talking or coughing, large droplets were
normally visible on the filters (diameters around 1–3 mm). These
droplets had not evaporated by the time these filters were
immersed in the transport media. Yet, influenza virus RNA was
still not detectable even in these samples. The detection of little or
no influenza RNA in these experiments was initially surprising, but
again, maybe compatible with the results of Milton and colleagues
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[18], who showed maximum copy numbers of ,1000 by day 3 of
illness in both coarse (.5 mm) and fine (#5 mm) aerosol particles.
Duguid [34] suggested that large droplets are mostly generated
from the anterior mouth. Influenza viruses, however, are rarely
found in human saliva (Cowling et al. unpublished data) due to the
antiviral substances existing in saliva [35]. Hence there is a
possibility that large droplet transmission of influenza may not be
important. This may also be true from a different angle. Breathing
tends not to produce large droplets [28] and breathing is the most
common respiratory activity in humans, so this is probably the
most important human respiratory modality that would transmit
influenza. Although coughing and sneezing do produce larger
droplets, very little time is actually spent coughing and sneezing by
most people (though admittedly the frequency of coughing and
sneezing may increase with some respiratory infections), so these
modalities in general, may not be most important for influenza
transmission.
Dispersion of exhaled aerosols with distance may reduce
the likelihood of transmission
These negative results may be also due to low virus
concentration at a distance from the source caused by a dispersion
effect. This is perhaps one of the more important differences
between our experiment and other studies with successful virus
recovery [15–18,28–29], i.e. that we did not capture the whole
exhaled breath volume (regardless of modality, i.e. breathing,
talking, coughing, etc.) from the sources. Hence, the total amount
of viral RNA that was potentially detectable in these Hong Kong
and Singapore studies may not be comparable to these other
studies, and will likely be considerably less (see the estimated
detectable viral loads in Video S1).
This explanation would also apply to the Singaporean
experiments, and a qualitative visual confirmation of this dispersal
effect can be seen from the shadowgraph images (Figure 3,
Video S1). This figure also suggests the various parameters that
are likely to affect the extent of the dispersal (and therefore
dilution) of this exhaled airflow, including the mouth-opening
diameter (D0), mean dispersal angle (a) and propagation distance
(x). Previous studies have measured these parameters in human
volunteers, giving ranges for the mouth-opening diameter during
coughing as D0=2.34 cm [36], and mouth-breathing as
D0=1.23 cm [37], with a mean dispersal angle for mouth-
breathing and coughing of a=25–35u (mean 30u) [36,37]. An
exact equation taking into account these parameters, together with
the various air mass exchanges across the boundaries of the
spreading cone due to turbulent flows, as well as the behaviour of
the smaller scale airflows within the spreading cone, is beyond the
scope of this article. However, it is clear from Figure 3 (and
Video S1) that the final numbers of droplets (and any virus that
they might be carrying) arriving at the recipient’s inhalation zone
are likely to be considerably lower than that which left the source.
Another point to note from the shadowgraph images shown in
Figures 2 and 3 (and Video S1) is that although the volunteers
were asked to breathe, talk, cough and laugh directly towards the
manikin from various distances, their natural, involuntary head
movements (particularly during coughing and laughing) were not
controlled in any way. These head movements, together with the
dispersion factor described above, may have also acted to reduce
the amount of virus landing on the manikin’s face in both studies.
However, these head movements were deliberately kept as natural
as possible to present realistic exposure scenarios for these
experiments.
Despite the sensitivity of RNA detection by the PCR method,
this dispersal and accompanying dilution (with ambient air) effect
may combine to make it difficult to detect any influenza RNA at
the manikin - either directly landing on the facial surface (as shown
in the Singapore experiments), or within the inhaled airborne
particles captured by the filter or the air sampler (as shown in the
Hong Kong experiments).
Totality of particle/droplet capture and durations of
exposure
Another possible reason for the lack of detection of any
influenza RNA is the relatively short duration of exposure: about
15 minutes in the Hong Kong and 10 seconds to a few minutes in
the Singapore experiments. In addition, for the Singapore
experiments, only a small rim was swabbed around the eyes,
under the nose and around the mouth of the manikin, which may
have reduced the amount of detectable virus in these experiments.
However, to some extent, it was one of the aims of these
experiments to assess what the likely influenza transmission risk
would have been, given naturally occurring respiratory activities in
everyday situations. Other studies have detected low levels of virus
in exhaled particles from coughing and breathing in enclosed
chambers for complete particle exposure/inhalation counts
[15,17,28,29], with longer exposure and collection times of up to
20–30 minutes [15,29], but these are artificial experimental
situations. In naturally occurring exposure scenarios, dispersion
and dilution of these exhaled particles is quite normal and these
experiments were designed to test how much viral RNA was
detectable at the manikin’s face, in spite of these dispersal and
dilution factors. Two studies that investigated coughing into a
closed chamber found that very little virus can be found in droplets
produced by coughing (,50 viral RNA copies per cough [17],
despite significant numbers of droplets being produced during
coughing whilst infected with influenza (mean number 75,400/
cough, median 46,400/cough, s.d. 97,300/cough, [28]). However,
the diagnostic influenza viral load by qPCR from nasopharyngeal
swabs collected from the infected volunteers in the former study
[17] was reported as being very low (median viral copy number of
51 per sample). In this study, the diagnostic ‘source’ viral RNA
copy numbers were much higher than this, so it might be expected
that the amount of virus reaching the target manikins would be
much higher.
Possible limitations of the sampling and detection
methods
In the Singapore experiments, an alternative possible explana-
tion might be that the surface of the manikin’s face may have been
too smooth to capture these airborne droplets (unlike human facial
skin and mucous membranes) and that even if the droplets were
carrying significant numbers of viruses, the droplets simply
‘bounced’ off the manikin’s face, without leaving any detectable
influenza RNA. From the shadowgraph imaging, it is clear that
exhalation flows certainly impact upon the manikin’s face (this is
especially obvious with the close-up coughing from about 0.1 m
distance). For these Singapore experiments that used a thermal
manikin (with a surface skin temperature similar to that of a
human – around 33–35uC), the generated thermal plume may be
an additional factor that could have reduce the amount of
airborne virus actually settling on the manikin’s skin surface. The
human thermal plume has been described in various studies, and
may act as a sort of natural, protective air curtain in this regard
[38–40]. Perhaps both of these reasons may be relevant in these
experiments, and further studies are required to resolve this issue.
In the Hong Kong experiments, a pump was used to extract air
through filters, which will increase the evaporation rate of droplets
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deposited on the filter. Together with the accompanying shear
stresses applied to the influenza virus (which is a relatively labile,
lipid-enveloped RNA virus), this would also decrease the virus
survival rate on the filter, though this should not significantly affect
the PCR detection sensitivity of viral RNA. However, the SKC
BioSampler also has limitations in that its collection efficiency
decreases significantly with increasing particle diameter from
about 100% with 4 mm particles to about 30% with 9mm particles
[41]. This may underestimate the viral loads detected in larger
particles. With the PTFE filter capture and detection methods, any
loss of sensitivity was relatively limited, with the log10(inoculated)
vs log10(detected) viral loads being mostly within 10% of each
other, according to the baseline experiments.
Comparison with other similar studies
Two other studies by Bischoff and colleagues have estimated
approximate viral concentrations at certain distances. A study on
the potential transocular transmission of influenza suggested that
exposure to aerosolised influenza at a distance of up to 1 foot,
would be sufficient to inoculate (i.e. infect) most exposed human
subjects via the ocular route [42]. However, this exposure may
bear little resemblance to a natural exposure with wild-type
seasonal influenza virus, as it consisted of a 20-minute exposure to
a mechanical aerosol generator emitting a mono-dispersed aerosol
(of approximately 4.9 mm diameter) of the live attenuated vaccine
(‘Flumist’) strain of influenza. The virus concentrations of this
artificially generated aerosol and the naturally generated aerosols
are difficult to compare.
Bischoff et al. [43] subsequently attempted to define concen-
tration contours around patients infected with influenza, using
Andersen samplers to sample air at head level distances of #
0.305 m (1 ft), 0.914 m (3 ft) and 1.829 m (6 ft) away the heads of
influenza infected patients. The upper limits of the viral
concentration measured at 0.305 m and 0.914 m were roughly
similar at approximately 400–600 and 350–600 ‘‘influenza virus
RNA copies per 10-L human respiratory minute volume’’.
Although this unit is difficult to compare to the results of the
Hong Kong and Singapore experiments exactly, it does seem to
agree with the implications of Milton et al. [18] that the airborne
viral load exhaled by infected patients/volunteers is not particu-
larly high, and together with the dispersion calculations above,
may well result in very little virus actually reaching and depositing
within the breathing zone of a susceptible recipient up to 1 m
away.
In summary, these two complementary sets of experiments from
Hong Kong and Singapore, with naturally-infected human
volunteers, exhaling in various respiratory modalities, directly
onto manikin targets, resulted in no detectable transmission of
influenza virus RNA. Taking into account other recent findings of
the relatively low viral loads in aerosolised droplets [18], this
suggests that influenza may not be particularly transmissible by the
aerosol route in most circumstances. Further experiments are
required to confirm these findings. However, this does not exclude
the possible transmission of the virus in situations with longer
exposure/contact periods, or in super-spreader individuals who
may well shed higher levels of virus in aerosolised form.
Supporting Information
Video S1 A 21-year old male coughing onto the target
thermal, breathing manikin from 0.1 m then 1 m
distance. Images shot at 2000 frames-per-second (fps) on a
Photron SA1.1 high-speed camera. Playback speed: 100 fps (about
one quarter normal speed) for clarity.
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